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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VICTOR L. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
WILLIAM D. CALLISTER, et al., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8584 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The above-entitled cause of action presents a contest 
between the holder of a tax title, the Plaintiff and Respondent 
herein, and the owner of the legal title, the Defendant and 
Appellant herein. 
Said cause came on for trial on May 22nd, 1956, in the 
San Juan County District Court, before the Hon. F. W. Keller, 
Judge, sitting without a jury. 
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The record shows that one Freland Bales secured a patent 
to the property which is subject to the suit, from the United 
States on November 8th, 1926, recorded August 5th, 1930, 
in the San Juan County records. (Page 1, Abstract of Title, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A".) On September 1st, 1948, the said 
Freland Bales and Mildred Bales, his wife, quit-claimed to 
Defendant, William D. Callister, which deed was recorded 
September 7th, 1948, in the San Juan County records. (Page 
4, Abstract of Title, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and Defendant's 
Exhibit 2.) 
Page 2 of said Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" shows a document 
entitled "Auditor's Tax Deed" dated March 12th, 1932, 
whereby said property purportedly was conveyed to San Juan 
County by the County Auditor. In this document there was 
no reference to the year for which the property was assessed. 
Page 3 of said Abstract shows a document entitled "Tax 
Deed" dated February 9th, 1944, whereby said property pur-
portedly was conveyed by San Juan County to Victor L. 
Peterson, the Plaintiff herein. Neither of these two deeds was ac-
knowledged or witnessed, although they were recorded in the 
County records. 
The other documents contained in said abstract are not 
material to the issues raised in this appeal. 
It was stipulated between counsel for the respective 
parties hereto that the assessment roll for the year 1927 did not 
have attached thereto the two auditor's affidavits required by 
law. (Page 15 of Transcript.) 
From the evidence, it is quite clear that the Plaintiff and 
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his family lived on the premises from about 1943 until the 
action was filed; that they had a home on the property; had 
cleared and cultivated about 100 acres and had grazed the 
balance thereof; and that they had enclosed the property with 
fencing, although there is no evidence as to the date the fenc-
ing was constructed. (Pages 6 to 13 of Transcript.) 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "B", admitted in evidence, is a state-
ment by the San Juan County Treasurer, setting forth the 
taxes and payment thereof from 1945 to 1955. The property 
was assessed to Victor L. Peterson each year. The property 
went to treasurer's tax sale for the years 1945 and 1946, and 
redemption thereof was by Victor L. Peterson on March 4th, 
1947. The property also went to treasurer's tax sale for the 
years 1947 and 1948, and redemption thereof was by Mrs. 
V. L. Peterson on February 17th, 1949. The property also 
went to treasurer's tax sale for the year 1949, and redemption 
thereof was made May 15th, 1954, by Victor L. Peterson, 
at the May sale at the expiration of the redemption period. 
This exhibit also shows that the taxes for the year 1950 
were paid, but no date or name of payor is shown. The taxes 
for the years 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954 were paid before 
delinquency. The taxes for 1955 were paid after the com-
mencement of the within suit. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court found the issues 
for the Plaintiff and against this Defendant, quieting title 
in said Plaintiff, and findings, conclusions and decree were 
signed and filed accordingly. From this decree, the Defendant 
William D. Callister appealed. 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. Plaintiff has not established a valid tax title. 
2. Plaintiff has failed to establish any title whatsoever. 
3. Legal title holder is not barred by the four-year adverse 
possession or limitation statutes on tax titles. 
4. Legal title holder is not barred by the seven-year ad-
verse possession or limitation statutes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED A VALID TAX 
TITLE. 
Plaintiff, in introducing in evidence the Abstract of Title, 
Exhibit "A", which contains the patent to Bales and Bales' 
subsequent quit-claim deed to this Defendant, established this 
Defendant's legal title. In order to prevail, it is mandatory 
either that Plaintiff prove a valid tax title, or that he prove 
adverse possession of the property, or that he establish a 
statutory limitation as a bar to the defense. 
Plaintiff and this Defendant stipulated that the auditor's 
affidavits required by law (Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, 
Paragraphs 5982 and 6006) were not attached to the assess-
ment roll for the year 1927, which appears to be the year the 
taxes became delinquent, and for which the property went to 
treasurer's tax sale. 
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Our Supreme Court has held, repeatedly, that the failure 
of the county auditor to attach either one of these two affidavits 
voids the treasurer's tax sale, and the subsequent auditor's 
tax deed. Please see Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 
Pac. (2) 513; Tree v. White, 171 Pac. (2) 398; Petterson v. 
Ogden City, 176 Pac. (2) 599; Equitable Life and Casualty 
Insurance Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Ut. 569, 144 Pac. (2) 526. In 
the last cited case, at page 527, the Court stated: "We hold 
that both of these auditor's affidavits are essential, and that 
both must be executed and attached to the assessment roll 
... By reason of the failure of the County Auditor to execute 
and attach his affidavits to the assessment roll as required 
by the statutes, the tax sale for the year 1936 was invalid, 
and the tax deed issued to Plaintiff and Appellant is likewise 
invalid.'' 
Thus, for the lack of the two auditor's affidavits on the 
assessment roll in the instant case, Plaintiff's tax title is de-
fective and void. 
There are three other reasons why Plaintiff has not estab-
lished a valid tax title. 
First, he did not put in evidence the treasurer's tax sale 
certificate for the year 1927, the year for which the property 
went to sale. It is elementary that this evidence is vitally 
essential in establishing the chain of events to prove a tax 
title. 
Second, the auditor's tax deed (page 2 of abstract of 
title, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A") did not have any refetence to 
the year for which the taxes were assessed, as required by 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Paragraph 6030. 
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Third, neither the auditor's tax deed nor the deed from 
the County to the Plaintiff (Pages 2 and 3 of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "A") was acknowledged or proved as required by 
our statutes in proving conveyances of real property. However, 
the argument on this matter will be set out at length under 
Point 2. 
Consequently, there is but one conclusion, and that is, 
that Plaintiff failed completely to prove a valid tax title. 
POINT 2. 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY 
TITLE WHATEVER. 
This Defendant takes the position that the Plaintiff not 
only has failed to show a valid tax title, but has absolutely 
failed to show any title in himself whatever. 
The attention of this Court is respectfully called to Section 
1-1-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which provides that an 
abstract of title "shall be received by the courts of this state 
as prima facie evidence of its contents ... " 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "A", an abstract of title, contains an 
auditor's tax deed followed by a deed from the County to 
the Plaintiff (Pages 2 and 3, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A") both 
of which are essential to establish any title in Plaintiff. There 
was no other evidence of title. Neither document was ac-
knowledged; neither was witnessed. 
It might be pointed out here that all other documents 
in the abstract were either acknowledged, or were subscribed 
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and sworn to before a notary. So, this does not seem to be 
just an abstractor's mistake. 
Thus, under the provisions of Section 1-1-15, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as set out above, all the trial court had before 
it was prima facie evidence of two documents entitled "deeds" 
which were not acknowledged or witnessed. 
Let us now consider the statutes relating to the proving 
of execution of conveyances. 
Section 57-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as 
follows: "Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances. 
-Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is 
conveyed or may be affected shall be acknowledged or proved 
and certified in the manner hereinafter provided." 
Then follow several sections relating to the manner of 
taking acknowledgments, including Section 57-2-7, which sets 
forth the form of the certificate itself. 
Section 57-2-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads as 
follows: "Proof of execution-How made.-The proof of the 
execution of any conveyance whereby real estate is conveyed or 
may be affected shall be: 
( 1) By the testimony of a subscribing witness, if there is 
one; or, 
( 2) When all the subscribing witnesses are dead, or can 
not be had, by evidence of the handwriting of the party, and 
of a subscribing witness, if there is one, given by a credible 
witness to each signature." 
Following this section are several others relating to other 
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details of the proof, including Section 57-2-13, which sets forth 
the form of the certificate to be used in such proof. 
In view of the foregoing, we are not concerned here merely 
with the identification of documents for admission into evi-
dence, nor merely with the formalities incident to recording. 
We are concerned with the establishment of the execution of 
conveyances of real property. Definitely, the requirements of 
the foregoing statutes are clear, and they are mandatory. 
Although the statutes provide two methods, either by 
acknowledgment of the conveyance, or the proving of the execu-
tion of the conveyance by a subscribing witness, neither require-
ment was met in the instant case. 
Section 57-1-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, after setting 
forth the form of quit-claim deed, reads as follows: 
"Such deed when executed as required by law shall have 
the effect of a conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate 
of the grantor in and to the premises therein described and 
all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, 
at the date of such conveyance." 
But these two deeds were not "executed as required by 
law." As a result, they do not have the effect of conveying the 
right, title, interest and estate of the grantors. 
Thus, the Plaintiff has failed to establish the execution of 
the conveyances in his chain of title. And having failed to 
establish the conveyances, he has failed to establish the title 
itself, upon which he relies. In fact, he has established no title 
in himself at all, either valid or invalid. 
10 
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This step in Defendant's argument is preliminary to Point 
3 which follows. 
POINT 3. 
LEGAL TITLE HOLDER IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
FOUR-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSION OR LIMITATION 
STATUTES ON TAX TITLES. 
From Plaintiffs Findings of Facts and amendments thereto 
(Pages 36 and 55 of the Record), it appears that the Plaintiff 
relied upon the provisions of Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, 
which is a four-year adverse possession statute and a four-year 
limitation statute on the holder of a legal title out of possession, 
wherein a tax title is involved. 
This Defendant contends that the Plaintiff has not intro-
duced sufficient evidence to come within the provisions of this 
act. Let us first consider the definition of a "tax title" as pro-
vided in said act. 
"Section 104-2-5.11. The term tax title as used in Section 
104-2-5.10 and section 80-10-68.10, and the related amended 
sections 104-2-5, 104-2-7, and 104-2-12, means any title to real 
property, whether valid or not, which has been derived through 
or is dependent upon any sale, conveyance or transfer of such 
property in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquida-
tion of any tax levied against such property whereby the prop-
erty is relieved from a tax lien." 
As set out above, in order for Plaintiff to come within the 
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First, that he has a title, whether valid or not. 
Second, that he received it in the course of a statutory 
proceeding for the liquidation of a tax levied against the 
property. 
Third, he is required to show that the property is relieved 
from a tax lien. 
These requirements are specific and definite. If Plaintiff 
has failed to show any one of them, he cannot avail himself of 
the provisions and benefits of the act. 
Now let us look at the evidence, or rather the lack of 
evidence. 
As set forth in Point 2 above, Plaintiff in introducing deeds 
essential to his title which were not acknowledged or proved 
as required by law, established no title whatsoever, valid or 
otherwise. Consequently, he has failed in the first requirement 
of the definition of a tax title. 
In regard to the second requirement of the above definition 
of a tax title, he did not put in any evidence of a tax levied 
against the property for the year 1927, the year for which it 
presumably went to sale, which was subsequently liquidated. 
Thus, he has failed in this requirement of the definition. 
Plaintiff put in absolutely no evidence of a tax lien, from 
which the property was relieved. The only evidence whatsoever 
that referred to any tax was the auditor's tax deed, defective 
as it was, and it was not competent to show either the tax or 
the lien. 
Had Plaintiff put in evidence a certified copy of the treas-
12 
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urer' s tax sale certificate, showing the tax and subsequent sale 
for the unpaid 1927 taxes, then the second and third require-
ments of the definition set forth above might have been met. 
Having not done so, he has completely failed to prove a tax 
title as defined. 
Consequently, the Plaintiff, having failed completely to 
establish all three requirements of the definition of tax title 
set forth in Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, all of which are 
essential to bring him within the protection of its provisions, 
cannot successfully contend that Defendant's legal title is barred 
by its limitation provisions. Nor can he successfully contend 
that his title is established by the adverse possession provisions 
thereof. 
By way of passing, this Defendant points out that the 
findings of facts do not set out the three requirements of the 
statutory definition of a tax title. Consequently, they are defec-
tive, and are insufficient to support the conclusions of law and 
decree. 
POINT 4. 
LEGAL TITLE HOLDER IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
SEVEN-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSI01-.J OR LIMITATION 
STATUTES. 
Inasmuch as the Plaintiff has failed to prove sufficient facts 
to come within the provisions of the four-year statute favoring 
tax deeds, the question now arises whether he has complied 
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According to the provisions of Section 78-12-12 of the 
Judicial Code, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and tne provisions 
of Section 104-2-12, Chapter 19, Laws of Utah 1951, the pay-
ment of taxes lawfully assessed for a period of seven years 
is necessary to establish adverse possession. 
However, the evidence in this case (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"B") shows that the property involved in this suit went to 
treasurer's tax sale for unpaid taxes during the years 1945, 
1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949. Redemption subsequently was 
made of each sale, the sale for the 1949 taxes being made five 
years thereafter, on May 15th, 1954, at the final May sale. 
According to the decision of this Court in Bowen v. Olson, 
2 Utah (2) 12, 268 Pac. (2) 983, redemption from a treasurer's 
tax sale is not the payment of taxes as required by our adverse 
possession statutes. Applying this to the instant case, the taxes 
for the years 1945 to 1949 cannot be counted. From the evi-
dence, we do not know who paid the 1950 taxes, or when. Thus, 
the only taxes lawfully assessed which were paid and which 
may be computed in behalf of the Plaintiff are those for the 
years 1951, 1952, 1953, and 1954. The action was filed before 
payment of the 1955 taxes. But this is only four years, and not 
seven. 
Consequently, the only conclusion that can be reached is 
that, again, Plaintiff has failed to prove his case and defeat 
this Defendant's legal title. 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
By way of summary and conclusion, the following are 
evident from the facts and the law of the instant case: 
1. This Defendant's legal title was established by the 
evidence. 
2. This Defendant's legal title was not defeated by a valid 
tax title in Plaintiff. 
3. Plaintiff completely failed to establish any title in him-
self whatever, either valid of otherwise. 
4. Plaintiff failed to introduce sufficient evidence to bring 
him within the protection of the four-year statute favoring tax 
titles, to defeat this Defendant's legal title. 
5. Plaintiff, in failing to prove payment of taxes for seven 
years as required by the adverse possession statutes, has not 
defeated this Defendant's legal title. 
Thus, inasmuch as the Plaintiff has failed as set forth 
above, it is respectfully urged by this Defendant that the decree 
of the District Court be reversed; that a decree be entered 
against the Plaintiff and in favor of the Defendant William D. 
Callister, adjudging and decreeing that he is the owner in fee 
simple of the property subject to the suit. 
Respectfully submitted. 
RALPH J. HAFEN and WILLIAM D. CALLISTER 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant. 
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